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Abstract
In this project we study the spread of the information through a social network.
The well known K-CENTER problem consists in, given a graph G = (V ,E) and a
integer k, to find a subset of nodes S ⊆V , |S| = k such that all nodes in V \S are
as close as possible to a node in S. In this project we study a related problem
in the context of social networks. Given a graphmodelling a social network, we
want to find a small subset of nodes such that targeting a product to the persons
in the subset lead an adoption of the product in all the graph as fast as possible.
We study the problem from an algorithmic game theoretical perspective.
Wemodel the K-CENTER problemas a strategic gamewhere eachplayer chooses
a node in the subset S. The set of Nash Equilibria of the game can be seen as
a set of alternative approximated solutions to the optimal solution. The com-
putation of the best response for a player and deciding if a strategy is a Nash
Equilibrium are polynomial time computable. The computation of the Social
Optimum is NP-hard. We show that the Price of Stability of the game is 1. We
study the Price of Anarchy of the game for different graph topologies and num-
ber of players. We show that for paths and cycles graph the POA is a factor of
the number of players. We perform experiments on other graph topologies and
with graphs extracted from DBLP co-authoring database.
Resum
En aquest projecte estudiem la difusió de la informació a través de les xar-
xes socials. El conegut problema dels K-CENTER consisteix en, donat un graf
G = (V ,E) i un enter k, trobar un subconjunt de nodes S ⊆ V , |S| = k tal que
tots els nodes de V \ S estiguin tan propers com sigui possible a algun node
de S. En aquest projecte estudiem un problema relacionat en el context de les
xarxes socials. Donat un graf que representa una xarxa social, volem trobar
un subconjunt d’individus a qui fer publicitat del nostre producte, de manera
que facin que tota la xarxa acabi coneixent-lo el més ràpid possible. Estudiem
aquest problema des del punt de vista de la teoria de jocs algorísmica.
Modelem el problema dels K-CENTER com un joc estratègic on cada jugador
escull un node del subconjunt S. El conjunt dels Nash Equilibria del joc es
poden interpretar com un conjunt de solucions aproximades a la solució òp-
tima. La computació de la best response i decidir si una estratègia és un Nash
Equilibrium són computables en temps polinòmic. La computació d’un Social
Optimum és NP-hard. Demostrem que el Price of Stability del joc es 1. Estu-
diem el Price of Anarchy del joc amb diferents topologies de grafs i nombre de
jugadors. Demostrem que per grafs camí i cicles el POA depèn del nombre de
jugadors. Mostrem els resultats dels experiments realitzats en altres topologies
de grafs així com amb grafs extrets de la base de dades de coautors de publica-
cions científiques DBLP.
Resumen
En este proyecto estudiamos la difusión de la información a través de las redes
sociales. El problema de los K-CENTER consiste en, dado un grafo G = (V ,E) y
un entero k, encontrar un subconjunto de nodos S ⊆ V , |S| = k tal que todos
los nodos en V \S estén lo más cerca posible de algún nodo de S. En este pro-
yecto estudiamos un problema relacionado en el contexto de las redes sociales.
Dado un grafo que representa una red social, queremos encontrar un grupo
de individuos a los que hacer publicidad de nuestro producto, de manera que
ellos consigan que toda la red acabe conociendo el producto lo más rápido po-
sible. Estudiamos este problema desde el punto de vista de la teoría de juegos
algorítmica.
Modelamos el problema de los K-CENTER como un juego estratégico donde ca-
da jugador escoge un nodo del subconjunto S. El conjunto de los Nash Equi-
libria del juego se puede interpretar como un conjunto de soluciones aproxi-
madas a la solución óptima. La computación de la best response de un jugador
y decidir si una estrategia es un Nash Equilibrium son computables en tiempo
polinómico. La computación de una estrategia que sea un Social Optimum es
NP-hard. Mostramos que el Price of Stability del juego es 1. Estudiamos el Price
of Anarchy del juego para diferentes topologías de grafos y número de jugado-
res. Demostramos que para grafos camino y ciclos el POA depende del núme-
ro de jugadores. Mostramos los resultados de los experimentos realizados con
otras topologías de grafos así como con grafos extraídos a partir de la base de
datos de co-autoría de publicaciones científicas DBLP.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This project is guided by two main goals: First, the culmination of the Degree
in Informatics Engineering, and the wish to apply together many of the knowl-
edge acquired during the degree, specially from some fields like computational
complexity, algorithmic game theory, graph theory and analysis and design of
algorithms. Second, to havethe possibility of participating in awork as an intro-
duction to scientific research, to learn how these kind of research is performed,
and to go deeper in the study of a concrete field, algorithmic game theory.
1.1 Motivation
On these days marketing based on the social networks and the word-by-mouth
have proved to be very effective, with a very little cost a product can reachmuch
more people than traditional marketing. The idea of viral marketing is that a
consumer of your product may ‘sell’ it to his friends, family or co-workers shar-
ing their impressions in social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram
or Youtube. There exist studies about the fact known as ‘emotional contagion’.
For example in [15] it is suggested that users of social networks are likely to ac-
quire opinions and emotions similar of what they see in their news feed.
Let us imagine thatwehave amanufacturing company of smart-phones andwe
build our latest product, the ‘aPhone’. We want that our marketing campaign
focus on social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram. Wewill select
a subset of users of these networks and give thema free ‘aPhone’, telling them to
share their impressions about the product and the brandon social networks, for
example posting a picture of it on Instagram or writing a Facebook post about
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it. Contacts of these users will see the product and may buy it and share their
impressions too, so after a while a large set of people will know the product.
Our goal is to maximize the spread of this information, so we have to choose
wisely the users that are given the ‘aPhone’ at the first instance.
Originally this problemwas addressedwith a centralized approach, as in [10] or
in [13]. We want to propose a different approach where different selfish players
have to choose which user, or nodes in a graph, should be activated first in
order tomade a product know by everybody as fast as possible. There are some
studies about the problem of social diffusion that will be reviewed in Section
1.2. The relevant difference in our project is the study of the problem from
a model of strategic game. We define the QUICK-BURNING GAME. We study
the existence of Nash Equilibria in the game and its quality. The analysis of
the quality of the equilibria give us an alternative way to attack the problem of
finding approximate solutions efficiently. The quality of the solutions depends
on how far are those equilibria from the optimal solution.
1.2 The K-CENTER problem and Influence Propaga-
tion
In this section we review the previous known results in the literature related
with our project. We focus the review in the classical optimization problem of
the K-CENTER of a graph as well in the related problem of the propagation of
information in social networks.
The K-CENTER problem is a classical facility location problem that asks to find
a subset of nodes of a given graph such that all the remaining nodes are "close"
to a node in the subset. For instance, one may wish to know where are the
best places in a city to place firefighter stations, Internet provider or whatever
facility. Formally, the problem can be defined as follows:
K-CENTER PROBLEM: Given a graph G = (V ,E) and a integer k, find the small-
est l such that exists a subset of nodes S ⊆ V with |S| ≤ k such that such that
maxv∈V {mins∈S d(v, s)}≤ l .
The K-CENTER PROBLEM is computationally hard (see [11]). TheMINIMUM DOM-
INATING SET can be reduced to the K-CENTER PROBLEM, and then the later is
NP-hard.
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Let us consider the decisional version of the K-CENTER PROBLEM and the deci-
sional version of MINIMUM DOMINATING SET:
K-CENTER-DECISIONAL: Given a graph G = (V ,E), an integer k, and an in-
teger l decide if there exists a set of nodes S ⊆ V with |S| ≤ k such that
maxv∈V {mins∈S d(v, s)} ≤ l , where d(u,v) is the distance between nodes u and
v .
DOMINATING SET: Given a graphG = (V ,E) and integer k decide if we there is a
subset S ⊆V , |S| ≤ k such that every node ofG is in S or has a neighbor that is in
S.
K-CENTER-DECISIONAL can be reduced from DOMINATING SET.
Theorem 1.2.1. K-CENTER DECISIONAL is NP-Complete.
Proof. It is not hard to see that K-CENTER-DECISIONAL ∈NP. Given a graph G =
(V ,E) , a integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n, a integer l ≥ 1 and a solution S ⊆ V , |S| = k the
property that ∀v∈V ∃x∈S such that d(v,x)≤ l can be verified in polynomial time
with respect to |V |.
Let us define a function f such that < G ,k >∈ DOMINATING SET if and only if
f (< G ,k >) ∈ K-CENTER-DECISIONAL defined as f (< G ,k >) =< G ,k,1 >. By
definition < G ,k >∈ DOMINATING SET if and only if ∃S ⊆ V |S| ≤ k such that
∀v∈V (v ∈ s)∨ (∃x∈V (v,x) ∈ E). Then, < G ,k >∈ DOMINATING SET if and only
if < G ,k,1 >∈ K-CENTER-DECISIONAL. Hence, f (< G ,k >) =< G ,k,1 > reduces
from DOMINATING SET to K-CENTER-DECISIONAL.
Observe that the K-CENTER PROBLEM arises naturally in the context of social
networks. For instance, in [17] Nehez et al. study the maximum distance be-
tween the nodes of a given set S ⊆ V (called seeds) and any other node of the
graph. They propose a greedy algorithm to estimate a lower bound of this dis-
tance. They also present a genetic algorithm that computes a solution with a
quality close to the optimal solution.
We can see that the K-CENTER PROBLEM also have a close relationship with
problemsof viralmarketing and influencepropagation in social networks.
Domingos and Richardson study in [10] the problem of choosing in which po-
tential customer should focus a company in order to increase their benefit, not
only thinking on a customer as someone who may buy your product, but as
someone that can spread your product among their relatives. They modeled
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the ‘market’ of customers as a social network, where every customer has his
contacts and influences and it is influenced by them.
In [13] Kempe et al. study the problem ofmaximizing the social spread of infor-
mation. They explain the two main diffusion models studied in the literature:
the Linear Threshold Model, where each node v have a threshold θv ∈ [0,1] that
represents the fraction of neighbours that should be active for v to become ac-
tive. Each edge between nodes v and u has also a weight bv,u . Initially a set of
nodes A0 is activated. At every step t all nodes that were active in step t −1 are
active, and every node such that the sum of the weights of the edges between
its active neighbours is at least his threshold becomes activated:∑
u active neighbour ofv
bu,v ≥ θv
The process endswhen all nodes are active orwhennomore nodes can become
active. The other diffusion model is the Independent Cascade Model, which is
a probabilistic model. The system has a parameter pv,u , where v and u are
neighbour nodes, that is the probability that u becomes active because of the
influence of v . Like in the Linear Threshold Model a set of nodes A0 is initially
active. When a node v becomes active in step t it can to activate each of his
neighbours u with probability pv,u . If it succeeds, node u will become active in
step t+1. If it fails, then node v can not convince u and v will notmake any fur-
ther attempt to convince him in subsequent steps. The process ends when all
nodes are active or when nomore nodes can become active. In bothmodels the
influence is represented by ρ(A), the expected number of activated nodes at the
end of the process if the initial set of active nodes A0 is A. The INFLUENCE MAX-
IMIZATION problem asks, for a parameter k, to find a subset of nodes S of cardi-
nality k such that ρ(S) ismaximized. The INFLUENCE MAXIMIZATION problem is
NP-hard independently of the diffusion model. They show that the INFLUENCE
MAXIMIZATION problem can be approximated with a polynomial time greedy
algorithm with a factor of (1−1/e − ²), about a 63% of the quality of the opti-
mum. They experimentally tested their algorithm with data from Arxiv [2] and
proof that their algorithm outperforms other know heuristics for this problem.
They also introduce a general framework for influencemaximization problems,
where different types of processes are studied, such the case where nodes can
change from inactive to active and from active to inactive.
In [16] Lappas et al. introduce the k-EFFECTORS problem, that asks to find the
k nodes of a graph that better explains the observed activation state in a prob-
abilistic diffusionmodel. They prove that for the general case the k-EFFECTORS
problem is NP-hard to solve optimally and also NP-hard to approximate. In
some concrete graph topologies, such as the case of trees, the k-EFFECTORS
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problem can be solved in polynomial time using a dynamic programming al-
gorithm. They proposed an approximation algorithm that from any graph ex-
tracts what they call the Influence Tree and use their polynomial time algo-
rithm to find the effectors on that tree. They tested their algorithms against
the DBLP dataset, searching effectors in different scientific communities get-
ting that their algorithm performs well enough, finding sets of authors that are
really relevant for their communities.
In the majority of the previously commented works the goal is to maximize the
influence of an idea of a product without having competence. In [18] Tzoumas
et al. study how to maximize the spread of a product when there are other try-
ing to maximize the spread of their products too. They propose a competitive
game model where two or more firms try to convince as most of consumers as
possible. Initially each firm chooses a number of nodes that will be initially ‘in-
fected’ with their product and will infect its adjacent nodes. A node can only be
infected with one product, and once it adopts it, it never changes. Their main
results are that in their proposed game with 2 players is co-NP-hard to decide
if there exists a NE in a given game. In the game with an arbitrary number of
players, where it may exists NE strategies but its cost may be far from the op-
timum. They also discuss the specific parameters of the network in relation
with the existence of Nash Equilibria. This parameters are the diffusion depth
of a game (defined as the maximum possible duration of the diffusion process)
the ideal spread (defined as the maximum possible spread that a strategy can
achieve) and the diffusion collision factor (defined as a measure for comparing
how two strategies of one player perform against a given strategy of another
player).
In [8, 9] Bonato et al. introduce a new graph parameter, the burning number
that measures how fast the nodes of a graph can be contagied. Its contagion
model imitates the spread of a fire. Every node is either burned or unburned.
There are discrete time-steps. At every time-step t an unburned node is se-
lected and becomes burned and all the nodes that were unburned and had a
burned neighbour at step t − 1 become burned. The process ends when all
nodes are burned. The burning number of a graph G , b(G) is the minimum
number of time-steps that needs the process to end. They prove that comput-
ing the burning number of a graph in NP-complete. They characterize the burn-
ing number via a decomposition of a graph in trees and they conclude that the
burning number of an arbitrary graph is theminimumburning number among
the spanning trees of the graphs. They also explore the bounds of the burn-
ing number for different graph topologies, such as Path graph where they proof
that the burning number of a path is b(Pn = dn1/2e), and similarly, for cycles the
burning number is b(Cn = dn1/2e). They also study the bounds of the burning
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number in graph that have been proven to have a similar structure than social
networks, such as Cartesian grids and local iterated transitivity model.
In [6, 7] Àlvarez et al. study the problem of the firefighters, which consists in
given a graphwhere a fire is started in a node, choosewhere to place firefighters
that would prevent the fire to be spread. At each round burning nodes spread
the fire to their neighbours and a new firefighter is placed. The firefighter prob-
lem is NP-hard. In this paper the firefighter problem is modelled as a strategic
game, where each player chooses where to place a firefighter only based on
their own interest (a player is rewarded in function of the nodes that are saved
by his action) instead of being globally coordinated. Their main results are that
for the general case the Price of Anarchy of the game, the relation between the
Nash Equilibrium with worst cost is lineal with respect the size of the input
graph, but there are some topologies, such as trees where the Price of Anarchy
is constant. If there can be coalitions between players then the quality of Equi-
libria increases, yielding that for the general case the Price of Anarchy is Θ(nk ),
where n is the size of the graph and k the coalition size.
1.3 Project contribution
We wanted to study the problem of information diffusion in social networks
from a game theoretical perspective. The contribution of this project may be
divided in twomain parts:
• The introduction of a strategic game model where each player chooses
one of the seeds in the initial set of active nodes in a graph, chooses a
node as a active node. Each of theses selected nodes is called seed. The
aim is to minimize the time until all nodes are activated. We study the
existence of equilibria strategies in the game as a solution concept, aswell
as the associated algorithmic problems, such as deciding if an strategy is
an equilibrium, computing the best response for a player and computing
the social optimum.
• The study of the quality of the equilibrium strategies, or what is the same,
the Price of Anarchy in different graph topologies. We compare the qual-
ity and efficiency of computing Nash Equilibria with other known ap-
proximation algorithms for the problem.
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1.4 Project outline
The structure of this document goes as follows:
• In Chapter 2 we explain the planning of the project, the tasks subdivision
and the planning of the cost and the social impact.
• In Chapter 3 we introduce the formal definitions and concepts related
with Game Theory and Strategic games used along this project.
• In Chapter 4 we introduce the problem studied in this project, the QUICK-
BURNING PROBLEM andwe introduce a strategic gamemodel thatmodels
the problem, the QUICK-BURNING GAME. We introduce related computa-
tional problems and analyse its complexity.
• In Chapter 5 we study the quality of the strategies that are Nash Equilib-
ria in our game. We study different topologies and we explain the experi-
ments carried out during the project.
• Finally, in Chapter 6 we summarize the obtained results and in Chapter 7
we consider new directions to attack the QUICK-BURNING PROBLEM.
• The project has an Appendix A where the implementation of the algo-
rithms used in the experiments is described.
15

Chapter 2
Project Management
2.1 Temporal planning
In this section, we will sumarize the temporal planning as well as the resources
needed for the development of the project.
2.1.1 Task description
In this subsection we will breakdown the task that conform the development of
the project.
2.1.1.1 Project definition
The first task in the project consist in deciding how will the project be. In a
initial stage a study on the field of Algorithmic Game Theory was performed as
well as an study of the state of the art of the social diffusion problems. We will
decide wich specific problem we will treat and how we will modelize it.
Project planning
This task consist in planning howmuch time we will spend on this project and
in what parts, as well as the tasks with relation to the formal inscription and
presentation of the project.
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2.1.1.1.1 Project planning
This consist in the temporal planning of the project. It have as a result this
document.
2.1.1.1.2 Control meetings
We will keep track of the evolution of the project by regular meeting to discuss
the obtained results and the current situation at each stage of the project. It will
help to prevent posible deviations and to manage them.
2.1.1.1.3 Bureaucratic tasks
This part is the bureaucratic part of the project, consist in inscribe the project
in the university, the GEP course and submission and the final presentation of
the project in the university.
Main theoretical development
This part will be the core of the project, a theoretical approach of a classical
problem using algorithmic game theory. Wewill proposemodels and bound its
parameters, what will make us able to know how good this models are.
2.1.1.1.4 Model proposal
We want to model the problem of burning a graph (select the nodes where a
fire will start, trying tominimize the time spent) as a game, so we have to chose
whowill the players be, what will be their strategy set, what will be their cost (or
payoff) function and how will the social cost (or welfare) computed.
As an example of model, the set of players may be the set of nodes of the graph,
their set of actions the choose wheter it is initially burning or not and the cost
function for each playermay be the out-degree of nodes who are set on fire and
0 for the ones who are not initially burning, if there are at most k nodes initially
burning, otherwise all costs will be∞. The social cost may be the number of
time-steps required to burn the graph.
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2.1.1.1.5 Model study
Oncewe have a proper definition of howour gamewill behavewewant to study
its properties. This consist of computing the Price of Anarchy and the Price
of Stability or, in case its hard to find exact values try to find lower and upper
bounds, that may depend of the size of the input graph, the number of players,
etc.
2.1.1.1.6 Refination of known properties
Some models may have different behaviour in different graph topologies or
may be easier to find equilibriums with a fixed number of players, so we will
search where our model performs the best and under wich conditons.
Experimentation
Once we have a good theoretical knowledge about the problem we will imple-
ment an algorithm based on our results and test how it behaves with real social
networks data.
2.1.1.1.7 Setup
Before start to code we have to install all the needed tools. The programming
part will be done using the Python programming language, so the only require-
ments are to install the interpreter and a text editor. We will also use git as a
Version Control System.
2.1.1.1.8 Graphmodule implementation
This part is not only important for the experimental part, it will be an impor-
tant helper in the theorical study of the problem. It will consist in implement a
library that simulates the game we are studying and computes if given a strat-
egy profile it is a Nash Equilibrium or howmany time is needed to burn a graph
with some given initial seeds.
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2.1.1.1.9 Game theory based algorithm implementation
Wewill implement an algorithmbased on the theoretical results obtained sowe
will be able to know how optimally we can solve the given problem with selfish
actors, and how good is it compared with centralized algorithms.
2.1.1.1.10 Data gather
As the main idea of the project is to study how the ideas propagate through an
online social network we will experiment with real world data. There are graph
repositories with data from social networks as Facebook or Twitter data, from
scientific literature citations an coauthoring or other online comunities. We
will execute our algorithm with this data and compare with some centralized
algorithm. When we get the data we have to implement a parser to use it as
input for our algorithm.
2.1.1.1.11 Results study
After experimentingwith real data wewill have a good vision about how good is
our algorithm in practice, so wewill be able to evaluate where can it be applied,
for example in marketing.
Documentation
This will consist in the documentation of all the work done during the project.
It compromises the project planification documentation, the formal writing of
the study we perform and the formal proof of the results we give. The code will
also be documented, as well of the results and some conclusions.
2.2 Budget
In this section we will estimate the economic impact of the project. The project
does not plan to generate any revenue, so there are no studied profit.
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2.2.1 Direct costs
Human resources
The different roles that will participate in the development of the project are
the following ones:
1. Researcher Responsible of the theoretical part of the project, consisting
in propose and study a model for a given problem.
2. Software developer Responsible of the implementation of the discussed
models and the empirical evaluation of the software.
3. Projectmanager Responsible of planning the project and coordinate the
ressources and the actors in order to finish it as expected with the given
timespan and budget.
In the following table is especified the division of the tasks described in the
temporal planning document. The price per hour of each actor is computed
according to PayScale [5].
# Task Hours Role 1 Role 2 Role 3
1 Project definition 5 - - 5
2 Project planning 70 - - 70
3 Model Proposal 40 40 - -
4 Model Study 50 50 - -
5 Refination of known properties 40 40 - -
6 Experimental Setup 5 - 5 -
7 Graphmodule development 30 - 30 -
8 Algorithm implementation 60 30 30 -
9 Data gathering 20 - 20 -
10 Algorithm test and execution 40 - 40 -
11 Results study and discussion 40 30 10 -
12 Control meetings 20 7 7 4
13 Documentation 40 20 20 -
Total 460 207 162 79
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Role Hours Price per hour Total
Researcher 207 30e 6.210e
Software developer 162 30e 4.860e
Project manager 79 45e 3.555e
Total 460 14.625e
Hardware resources
The only hardware resource needed for this project is the computer we will use
for developing it. The price is obtained from Apple webpage. The cost is espec-
ified in the following table:
Product Price
Computer 1.449e
Total 1.449e
Software resources
Most of the software that will be used to carry out this project is Open Source,
so there is no cost associated with it. The Operative System used is not Open
Source, but it is licensed with the computer, so it has no aditional cost.
Product Price
python 0e
vim 0e
LATEX 0e
git 0e
OSX 0e
Total 0e
2.2.2 Indirect costs
Other resources not directly related with the project will also be needed for its
development, so theymust be also considered in the budget planing. Themore
important are the electricity used and the paper.
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The power consumption of a Macbook Pro is 74.9 W per hour, according with
Apple [4]. As we said in the planning the project will take about 460 hours, so
the total consumed powerwill be energytotal = 460kW ∗74.9h = 34,454kWhWe
will use a lot of paper, about a pack of 500 sheets. It costs around 5e.
Product Price Units Cost
Electricity 0.12e/ kWh 34,454 kWh 4,13e
Paper 5e/ pack 500 5e
Total 9,13e
2.2.3 Unplanned costs
This section covers the costs caused by unexpected events that might increase
the price of the project. Ideally, none of themwill happen. We contemplate two
main scenarios where we will need more money to continue with the develop-
ment of the project:
1 Computer repairs The computer used to develop the projectmay have hard-
ware failures, in that case we will have to pay a repairment or to replace
it.
2 Lack of computer power The computer thatwewill use is surely enoughpow-
erful for the development, but maybe not for the execution of simula-
tions. If the computational resources aviable to use are not enough for
executing simulations with big inputs we may have to use an Amazon
AWS instance in order to execute there our algorithms.
According to the Amazon price calculator [1] a AWS instansce that fits our re-
quirements will cost 272,2eper month. Suposing that there is an 80% of prob-
ability that we need it we compute its cost as costAWS = 272,2∗0,8= 21,7e. An
estimate cost of a computer repair is 200e. We dont think it will crash, so we
assing a probability of 5% of needing a repair thus the cost will be costrepair =
200∗0,05= 10e.
Event Probability Price Cost
1 5 % 200e 10e
2 80 % 272.75e/ Month 21,7e
Total 31,7e
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2.2.4 Total budget
After an exhaustive analysis of the different costs of the project we are able to
estimate the total cost of the project.
Concept Price
Human resources 14.625e
Hardware resources 1.449e
Software resources 0e
Total direct costs 16.074e
Paper 5e
Electricity 4,13e
Total indirect costs 9,13e
Total unplanned costs 31,7e
Total 16114.83e
2.3 Sustainability
2.3.1 Economic sustainability
The price of the project is considered viable since most of the cost come by
humans resources, and a big part of the budget will be assigned to them. All
contempled salaries are reasonable given the high complexity of the task, both
the research and the implementation.
2.3.2 Social sustainability
Our studies may help us on understanding how we behave in social networks
and how are we affected by the other individuals in that scenario. It may be
applied tomake comunication between people faster, what will improve its life
quality.
2.3.3 Environmental sustainability
The hardware resources needed to develop the project are described in 2.2.1.
From them we cant estimate the impact studying how much electricity does
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them used, in total about 34kWh, and the emisions produced in the produc-
tion of that energy are about 13Kg of CO2, wich is significantly smaller thant
the average energy consumption per capita. In general this project have a very
small environmental footprint, because most of the work will be purely theo-
retical.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries: Strategic Games
Game theory is the branch of mathematics and economics that models situa-
tionswheremultiple individuals try to get asmuch benefit as they can, but their
outcome is affected by other individuals choices.
A strategic game is the mathematical representation of a situation where a set
of individuals, called players, have to decide what they do. Each player can only
do a limited number of things, the actions that he can play. Players recibe a
payoff or pay a cost that depends on the actions of the whole set of players. All
players play simoultaneously and they are unware of what the other players do.
The game consist in only one turn, where every player picks an action. Players
are selfish, so they only seek their own benefit (they try tomaximice they payoff
or minimize his cost).
Definition 3.0.1. Formally a strategic game is defined by a tuple
Γ= (N , (Ai )i∈N , (ci )i∈N )
where:
• N = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of players.
• Ai is the set of actions that are available to player i ∈ N . A strategy of
player i consists in selecting an action si ∈ Ai . Let S= A1× . . .× An be the
set of all possible strategy profiles.
• For each player i ∈N , ci :S→R is de cost function of player i .
Strategies. Each player chooses his action si ∈ Ai once, completely uninformed
from the decisions of other players. A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S of Γ
is a n-tuple composed of the strategies si selected by each player i . Given s
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and given a strategy s′i ∈ Ai , let (s−i , s′i ) denote the strategy profile that is the
outcome of replacing si by s′i , in s, (s−i , s
′
i )= (s1, . . . , si−1, s′i , si+1, . . . , sn)
Costs and Payoffs. The preferences of player i are usually represented with his
cost (or payoff ) function ci . The aim of each player is to select an strategy that
minimizes (or maximize, if the preference is defined as a payoff) his cost.
Social cost. The social cost (payoff) function C : S → R (U : S → R if it is a
payoff function) defines how bad (good) is a given strategy profile not for one
particular individual, but for all the society.
Nash Equilibrium
A Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile where no player, knowing his cost with
this strategy, wants to change his action, because in any case he would not im-
prove his cost.
Definition 3.0.2. Given a strategic game Γ = (N , (Ai )i∈N , (ci )i∈N ) we say that a
strategy profile s∗ = (s∗i , . . . , s∗n) is aNash Equilibrium (NE) ofΓ if for every player
i and for every s′i ∈ Ai it holds that ci (s∗)≤ ci (s∗−i , s′i ). Let NE(Γ) denote the set
of all NE strategies.
Best Response. Given a strategy profile s, the best response of player i to s−i is
definedby the set of actions of player i thatminimize his cost function suposing
that other players will stick to their actions. Formally, given any strategy profile
s and given any player i ,
BR(Γ, s, i )= {si ∈ Ai | ci (s−i , si )=min
s′i∈Ai
(ci (s−i , s′i ))}
Notice that s∗ = (s∗1 , . . . , s∗n) is a NE if and only if for each player i it holds that
si ∈ BR(s∗, i ).
Social Optimum
A strategy profile s of Γ= (N , (Ai )i∈N , (ci )i∈N ) is a social optimum (OPT) if for all
s′ ∈ S, C (s) ≤ C (s′), i.e. s minimizes the social cost C . Let OPT(Γ) be the set of
all OPT of Γ. Note that a social optimum does not necessarily have to be a Nash
Equilibrium.
28
Price of Anarchy
The Price of Anarchy (POA)was first defined by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
in [14]. It is a parameter that measures how selfish behaviour of players affect
the social outcome of the game. In other words, it quantifies howmuch the so-
cial cost grows if players are not coordinated. If we think of NE as the positions
to where players will naturally evolve, a good way of quantificate the degrada-
tion is comparing the social costs of worst NE and the OPT.
Definition3.0.3. LetΓ= (N , (Ai )i∈N , (ci )i∈N ) be a strategic gameand s∗ ∈ OPT(Γ).
The Price of Anarchy of Γ is defined as follows:
POA(Γ)= maxs∈NE(Γ)C (s)
C (s∗)
Price of Stability
The Price of Stability (POS) is the ratio between the lowest NE cost and the cost
of any OPT. It quantifies how good can selfish players do even if they act not
coordinated. In a game with POS > 1 the social cost of equilibrium strategies
will be always higher than the social optimum.
Definition 3.0.4. Let Γ = (N , (Ai )∀i∈N , (ci )∀i∈N ) be a strategic game and s∗ ∈
OPT(Γ). The Price of Stability of Γ is defined as follows:
POS(Γ)= mins∈NE(Γ)C (s)
C (s∗)
Examples
For better understanding all these concepts we give a pair of examples of strate-
gic games with significant differences.
The Prisoners Dilemma. There are two criminals that are caught by the police
and being judged simultaneously. The police have evidences of both of them
committing aminor crime and they suspect but do not have evidences of any of
them committing a major crime unless either of them betrays his collaborator.
If they remain silent, then theywill spend 1 year in prison for hisminor crime. If
only one of them betrays his partner, the traitor will be free as a reward and the
betrayed will be convicted for the major crime, so will spend 4 years in prison.
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If both of them fink and betray their partner, both will be convicted for a major
crime, but will be sightly rewarded for cooperation, so they will spend 3 years in
prison. The game is represented byΓ= (N = {1,2}, (A1,A2), (c1,c2)) where:
• The players are the two criminals
• A1 = A2 = {Quiet,Fink}
• S= A1× A2 = {(Quiet,Quiet), (Quiet,Fink), (Fink,Quiet), (Fink,Fink)}
• We can represent the cost of each player as the years that would have to
spend in prison. For player 1 we have that c1(Fink, Quiet) = 0, c1(Quiet,
Quiet) = 1, c1(Fink, Fink) = 3, and c1(Quiet, Fink) = 4. For player 2 we
have that c2(Fink, Quiet)= 4, c2(Quiet, Quiet)= 1, c2(Fink, Fink)= 3, and
c2(Quiet, Fink)= 0.
The costs of both players with respect to the strategies are shown in the table
below:
Quiet Fink
Quiet 1,1 4,0
Fink 0,4 3,3
The Social Cost of the game is defined as the sum of the years that both of them
spend in prision, soC (s)= c1(s)+ c2(s), as shown in the table below:
Quiet Fink
Quiet 2 4
Fink 4 6
In the Prisoners Dilemma there only exists one NE, when both prisoners fink.
If both prisoners fink any of them does not have incentive of changing from
fink to stay quiet, because his cost will increase. As we see the social cost of the
equilibrium strategy is greater than the social optimum, so in this case the Price
of Anarchy and the Price of Stability are 3.
Altought the Prisioners Dilemma have 2 NE strategies, there exists strategic
games with no NE. One of them if the Matching Pennies game. There are
two players, each one with a coin. They have to show a face of the coin, so
they have two strategies, Head and Tail. The first player wins if both shown
faces are equal, and the second player wins if they are different. The payoff for
each player are shown in the table below, with 1 representing a win and -1 a
loss.
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Head Tail
Head 1,−1 −1,1
Tail −1,1 1,−1
If the strategy is (Head, Head) or (Tail, Tail) player 1 cannot improve his cost, but
player 2 can change his strategy and win the game, improving his cost. Simi-
larly, if strategy is (Tail, Head) or (Head, Tail) player 1 can change his action and
improve his cost, hence there do not exists any strategy where players are in
equilibrium.
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Chapter 4
Quick-Burning Game
In this chapter we introduce a strategic game that models the social contagion.
In a graph that represent a social network. We let each of the players choose
a node of the graph where the information will star. Thinking in terms of viral
marketing each player chooses a customer that will be given a free product or a
good bargain and will talk about it to their contacts.
4.1 QUICK-BURNING PROBLEM
We define the burning time of a graph G = (V ,E) and a set of nodes S ⊆ V ,
b(G ,S), called SEEDS, as the number of steps untill all nodes are activated if ini-
tially the only active nodes are the ones in S. Every step all the unactive neigh-
bors of an active node became activated. We can also define the burning time
as:
b(G ,S)=max
v∈V
{min
s∈S
{d(v, s)}}
Thinking in a Social Network, if we want to publicy a new product we can show
it to a few users that will share the information in the social network and expect
other users to get to know the product for subsequents shares. The burning
time is the time untill all users are know the product.
We define the QUICK-BURNING problem as follows: Given a graph G = (V ,E)
and an integer k, we want to find a subset of nodes S ⊆V such that the burning
time b(G ,S) is minimized. The QUICK-BURNING problem is equivalent to the
optimization version of K-CENTER problem.
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4.2 Definition of the QUICK-BURNING GAME
The main subject of this project is to develop and study a non centralised al-
gorithm for solving the K-CENTER problem. We present a strategic gamemodel
where each player chooses a node to place a seed independently of other play-
ers. We study how are the social optimums of the game and the properties of
its equilibria.
We introduce a new model of strategic game named QUICK-BURNING GAME.
An instance of QUICK-BURNING GAME consist in a graph and a number of play-
ers. Each player choose a node of the graph where he place a seed that will
activate that node. The aim of every player is to activate all of the nodes as fast
as possible.
Formally an instance of the QUICK-BURNING GAME is defined by a tuple Γ =
(G ,k), where:
• G = (V ,E) is a undirected graph. From now on, let n = |V |.
• k is the number of players, k ≤ n. We assume that the set of players is
N = {1, . . . ,k}.
Each player chooses a node in the graph that will be activated at the initial step
(seed node). Hence, for each i ∈ N the set of actions of player i is defined by
Ai =V . A strategy profile ofΓ is a k-tuple s = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
(V ×V ×·· ·×V ) where
si is the node selected by player i .
The goal of the problem is to minimize the burning time, so players are re-
warded as the burning number decreases. All players have the same cost func-
tion, so for any strategy the cost of every player will be the same. For each
player i the cost function is defined as the burning time of G given the set of
seeds S = {si |1 ≤ i ≤ k} or∞ cost when his action is the same than some other
player action. With this we force that the equilibriums have no repeated seeds,
which would make the cost of the equilibrium strategies increase. More for-
mally,
ci (s)=
{
∞ ∃ j 6= i , si = s j
b(G ,S) otherwise
Figure 4.1: Cost function for players in QUICK-BURNING GAME
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Initially we tough about a cost function that rewards every player for their indi-
vidual contribution, computing the cost of every player as
c ′i (s)=
{
∞ ∃ j 6= i , si = s j
b(G ,S− {si })−b(G ,S) otherwise
Figure 4.2: Alternative cost function for players
We saw that the equilibrium strategies are exactly the samewith both cost func-
tions. If a strategy is a NE using the first cost function it means that b(G ,S) can-
not improve unilateraly, so any player canmake the graph burn faster, then us-
ing the second cost function no player can improve his cost, because it cannot
burn the graph faster. Similarly, if a strategy is a NE using the second cost func-
tion then any player can not contribute more to his cost. If any player can not
improve his cost, then b(G , s) can not decrease by an unilateral change. Then
the strategy is a NE using the first cost function. As the NE are the same with
both cost functions we kept the simpler one.
The social cost of a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sk) is the burning time ofG given
S = {si |1≤ i ≤ k},C (s)= b(G ,S). The social cost of a strategy is the same that the
cost of that strategy for each player.
4.3 Social Optimum and Nash Equilibria
In this section we study the existence and properties of Nash Equilibria in the
QUICK BURNING GAME and the relation with the Social Optimum.
Proposition 4.3.1. Any social optimum of a QUICK-BURNING GAME Γ is a NE.
Then, POS(Γ)= 1.
Proof. Let us suppose that s∗ = (s∗1 , . . . , s∗k ) ∈ OPT(Γ) and s∗ 6∈NE(Γ). Then, there
exists a player i that can improve his cost by changing his strategy s∗i by another
strategy si . SinceC (s∗−i , si )= ci (s∗−i , si ) andC (s∗)= ci (s∗) then
As a corollary of Proposition 4.3.1 we can conclude that for any instance of
QUICK BURNING GAME Γ there exists at least one NE, and that there exist a
strategy s such that s ∈NE and s ∈ OPT(Γ), so the Price of Stability of the QUICK
BURNING GAME is 1.
Proposition 4.3.2. There exists a strategy s∗ ∈NE such that s∗ 6∈ OPT(Γ)
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Proof. Let G = (V ,E) be a complete binary tree of depth 2. Let Γ = (G ,2). The
social optimumstrategy, illustrated in Figure 4.3a, is the onewhich places seeds
in the first level, so the root and all leaves are at distance 1 from a seed so the
social cost is 1., where the seeds are marked in red. In Figure 4.3b we can see
another NE strategy for Γ, but this one have cost 2, because nodes 5 and 6 are
at distance 2 from node 0. Any player can change to improve the cost, so the
strategy in Figure 4.3b is a NE but it is not the Social Optimum.
3
1
0
4 6
2
5
(a) Social Optimum and NE
6
2
0
3
1
5 4
(b) NE but not Social Optimum
Figure 4.3: Example of NE with worst cost than Social Optimum
4.4 Computational Complexity
In this sectionwe refer a strategy as s (a tuple) and S the set such that S = {si |1≤
1≤ k}.
In this sectionwe analyse the complexity of someproblems related to the QUICK-
BURNING GAME such as the computation of the Best Response, finding a Nash
Equilibrium or computing the Social Optimum of a game.
First we study how can we compute the best change that a player can unilater-
ally do, the BEST RESPONSE:
BEST RESPONSE Given Quick-burning game Γ = (G ,k), a strategy s = (s1, . . . , sk)
and an integeri 1 ≤ i ≤ k compute a strategy s′i that for all s′′i ci (s−i , s′i ) ≤
ci (s−i , s′′i ).
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The best response of a player may consist in changing the seed that he choose.
In order to compute the best response one may iterate over all possible actions
for a player, keeping only the one with the lowest cost.
Proposition4.4.1. The BEST RESPONSE problem is polynomial time computable.
Proof. Algorithm 1 computes the best response testing all possible alternative
moves for player i and then return one with minimum cost. As the alternative
moves are the n nodes ofG the for loop will be executed n times.
Input: Γ= (G ,k), s = (s1, . . . , sk), i integer
Output: s′i such that s
′
i ∈ BR(s, i )
c← b(G , s)
sr ← si
for s′i ∈ (V −S) do
c ′←b(G , s′) where s′ = (s−i , s′i )
if c ′ < c then
sr ← s′i
c← c ′
end
end
return sr
Algorithm 1: Best_response
Another important problem is how hard is to check if a given strategy is a Nash
Equilibrium or not:
IS NEGiven aQuick BurningGameΓ= (G ,k) and a strategy s = (s1, . . . , sk) decide
if s ∈NE(Γ), where Γ= (G ,k).
Since the strategy of any player in a NE profile is a best response for that player,
then it is not hard to see that deciding whether a given strategy is a NE is poly-
nomial time computable.
Proposition 4.4.2. The IS NE problem is polynomial time computable.
Proof. Algorithm 2 determines if a given strategy profile s is a NE. For each
player i computes its best response so if the action of that player is not in its
best response then s is not a NE because player i could change his action to
one in his best response and his cost decrease. The for loop will be executed at
most k times, so knowing that the best response can be computed inΘ(n) time
the temporal complexity of the algorithm isΘ(nk).
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Input: Γ= (G ,k), s = (s1, . . . , sk)
Output: True if s ∈NE(Γ), False otherwise
for i ← {1, . . . ,k} do
s∗i ← BR(Γ, s, i )
c∗← ci ((si−, si∗))
c← ci (s)
if c > c∗ then
return False
end
end
return True
Algorithm 2: is_NE
Now we can proof that, given a game, finding a strategy s such that s ∈NE and
that the social cost of s is the lowest possible in the game is an intractable prob-
lem.
OPT STRATEGY Given a Quick-burning Game Γ= (G ,k) compute a strategy pro-
file s ∈ OPT(Γ)
Proposition 4.4.3. The OPT STRATEGY problem is NP-hard.
Proof. Let us shown that OPT STRATEGY is in FP then K-CENTER-DECISIONAL is in
P. If OPT STRATEGY is in FP, given an input for K-CENTER-DECISIONAL,<G ,k, l >,
we can represent the game Γ = (G ,k) and compute an optimum strategy s∗ ∈
OPT(Γ), the one with minor cost possible.
<G ,k, l >∈ K-CENTER-DECISIONAL⇐⇒ l ≥C (s∗), s∗ ∈ OPT(Γ)
If C (s∗) ≤ l then the the subset of vertices S = {v |v ∈ s∗} holds that for every
vertex v ∈ V there exists a vertex u ∈ S such that d(u,v) ≤ l , then <G ,k, l > is
in K-CENTER-DECISIONAL. If the cost of the optimum is bigger than l then does
not exists such subset, so <G ,k, l > is not in K-CENTER-DECISIONAL.
Then,
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4.5 Best Response Dynamics
In this sectionwe study aDynamics process for theQuick-burning gamemodel
based on the computation of the best response.
Our dynamics start can start at any given strategy profile and at each round
a player computes his best response and changes his action to that. It is de-
scribed by the following algorithm:
Input: Γ Game, s = (s1, . . . , sk) strategy profile
Output: strategy s such that s′ ∈NE((Γ))
while s 6∈NE(Γ) do
foreach player i do
Compute s′i ∈ BRi (s)
if ci (s−i , s′i )< c(s) then
s = (s−i , s′i )
end
end
end
return s
Algorithm 3: Best_Response_Dynamics
Proposition4.5.1. Best ResponseDynamics onQUICK-BURNING GAME converges
to a NE in a polynomial time.
Proof. As the social cost and the cost for every player are the same, whenever a
player switches his strategy during the best response dynamics the social cost
decreases. The maximum social cost possible is the diameter of G (diam(G)),
which is clearly smaller than the number of nodes, so there may be at most
diam(G) rounds.
A δ-approximation algorithm for a NP-hard problem is a polynomial time al-
gorithm that computes a solution to the problem whose cost (the parameter
that we want to optimize) is at most δ times the optimum. A δ-approximation
algorithm for the K-CENTER PROBLEM is is NP-hard for any δ < 2, but there ex-
ists a polynomial time 2-approximation proposed by Hochbaum and Shmoys
in [12]. The proposed algorithm consists in finding an Independent Set I in the
square graphG2 of the input graphG such that |I | is smaller than the size of the
minimum dominating set in G . The square graph of G is a graph G2 = (V ′,E ′)
where the edge (u,v) ∈ E ′ if there is a path of length at most 2 between u and v
inG .
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It seems natural to think that if the Dynamics algorithm always converge in a
polynomial number of steps then the POA will ≥ 2, so the strategies computed
will have a cost far from the social optimum. If from any starting strategy pro-
file s the social costC (best_response_dynamics(Γ,S))< 2OPT(Γ) then P=NP
because as stated in [12] by Hochbaum et al. the best possible approximation
for the K-CENTER problem is a 2-approximation. Then we think that the cost
of the strategies computed by best_response_dynamics can not give an ap-
proximation guarantee of at most two times the cost of the social optimum.
P= NP.
In the next chapter we study the POA for particular graph topologies.
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Chapter 5
Quality of Equilibria
Given a game is interesting to know how good are the equilibria, what is the
cost of the best andworst equilibriumwith respect to the optimum. If theworst
equilibrium have a bad cost with respect to the optimum that means that an-
archic players can end in a very bad strategy but none of them can do anything
to improve it.
We have observed that with a Best Response dynamics process the cost of the
NE outputed is it likely to be at least twice of the cost of OPT. In this section we
study the quality of the equilibrium strategies with respect to the topology of
the graph and the number of players that induced the game.
5.1 Nash Equilibria in path graphs
In this section we study the quality of the equilibria in the class of path graphs.
A path graph is a connected graph where each node has degree 2 except two
of them, the endpoints, that have degree 1. Let Pn denote a path graph of n
nodes. From now on, we refer the nodes of Pn as follows: The endpoints are
labeled by 1 and n, respectively. A node at a distance i from node 1 is labeled
by i +1, for 1< i < n (see an example in Figure 5.1).
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 5.1: Example of path graph with 5 nodes
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2 Players game
First we characterize the quality of equilibria in the QUICK-BURNING GAME
when the number of players is fixed to 2.
Given any strategy profile (s1, s2) we can assume without loss of generality that
s1 ≤ s2. Note that the burning distance in a path graphPn is upper bounded by
the distances between seeds andbetween seeds and endpoints. Formally,
b(Pn , {s1, s2})=max{d(s1,1),
⌈
d(s1, s2)
2
⌉
,d(s2,n)}
Proposition 5.1.1. Let Γ = (Pn ,2) be a QUICK-BURNING GAME and let opt ∈
OPT(Γ). Then, C (opt)= ⌈n−24 ⌉
Proof. Let us consider the graph Pn (see Figure 5.2) and strategy s = (
⌈n−2
4
⌉+
1,n−⌈n−24 ⌉). The burning time of this strategy is b(Pn , s)= ⌈n−24 ⌉.
If player 1 decides to change s1 to s′1 ∈ {1, . . . ,
⌈n−2
4
⌉
} then b(G , (s−1, s′1))= d(s1, s2)≥⌈n−2
4
⌉
. If player 1 decides to change s1 to s′1 ∈ {n−24 +2, . . . , s2−1} then b(G , (s−1, s′1))=
d(1, s1)≥
⌈n−2
4
⌉
. Finally, if s′1 ∈ {s2+1. . . ,n} then b(G , (s−1, s′1))= d(1, s2)>
⌈n−2
4
⌉
.
In a similar way we can also prove that neither player 2 has incentive to change
his strategy individually nor both of them at the same time.Therefore, any strat-
egy s′ 6= s satisfiesC (s′)≥C (s). Then, s is a social optimum.
• a = n−24
• s1 =
⌈n−2
4
⌉+1
• b = n−24 +2
• c =
⌈3n−2
4
⌉−1
• s2 =
⌈3n−2
4
⌉
1 a s1 b c s2 n
. . . . . . . . .
Figure 5.2: Social optimum in line graph with 2 players
In a path graph it is convenient that the seeds divide the path in parts of sim-
ilar length. Then the burning time is optimum. If they are very close one to
the other at the center of the path, then they can not improve individually the
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1 s1 s2 n
n−2
2
n−2
2
. . . . . .
Figure 5.3: Worst Nash Equilibrium in path graphs with n even, s1 = n2 and s2 =
n
2 +1 the distance between them is 1
burning time. This is the case of a NE with a high social cost (see Figures 5.3
and 5.4).
1 s1 s2 n
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 5.4: Worst Nash Equilibrium in path graphs with n odd s1 = and s2 = the
central node of the graph is between them, so they are at distance 2:
Proposition 5.1.2. Let Γ= (Pn ,2) be a QUICK-BURNING GAME. There exists s ∈
NE(Γ) such that for all s′ ∈NE(Γ), C (s′)≤C (s)= n−22 .
Proof. The strategy shown in Figure 5.3 is seven = (n2 , n2+1) and the one in Figure
5.4 is sodd = (
⌊n
2
⌋
,
⌊n
2
⌋+2) .
There cannot be a strategy profile with worst cost than seven or sodd and is a
Nash Equilibrium. If player 1 decides to change s1 to s′1 we can have two differ-
ent cases:
• s′1 ∈ {1, . . .
⌊n
2
⌋
} : The distance between s2 and n will not be modified, so
b(G , (s−1, s′i ))= d(s2,n)2 = b(G , s).
• s′1 ∈ {n2 +2, . . .n}: In this case there is not any seed between 1 and s2, so the
burning time is the maximum between d(1, s2), d(s′1, s2)/2 and d(s
′
1,n).
The burning time b(G , (s−1, s′1)> b(G , s) because d(s2,1)> d(s1,1).
Similarly we have that player 2 cannot change his strategy and improve his cost.
Corollary 5.1.1. Let Γ= (Pn ,2) be a QUICK-BURNING GAME. Then, POA(Γ)= 2
k players game
Lemma 5.1.1. Let Γ = (Pn ,k) be a QUICK-BURNING GAME. Then, OPT(Γ) =⌊ n
2k
⌋
.
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Proof. Let l be an integer such that 2(l −1)k+k < n ≤ 2lk+k.
Let s∗ = (l +1+ i (2l +1))∀i∈{0,k−1} , with cost C (s∗) = n−k2k be a strategy for Γ =
(Pn ,k). The strategy s∗ is represented in Figure 5.5.
In s the distance between two consecutive seeds si , si+1 is at most 2l and at
least 2l − 1. Also l − 1 ≤ (s1,0) ≤ l and l − 1 ≤ d(sk ,n) ≤ l . The cost of s∗ is
C (s∗)=max
{
d(s1,1),d(sk ,n),
(
d(si ,si+1)
2
)
∀1≤i≤k
}
thenC (s∗)= l = n−k2k .
∀s′∈SC (s′) ≥ C (s∗)↔ s∗ ∈ OPT(Γ) Let us suppose s′ a strategy such that C (s′) =
l−1<C (S∗). IfC (S′)= l−1 then for each node v ∈V there is a seed in x ∈ s′ such
that d(u,x) ≤ l −1, then the maximum number of nodes that can have a path
graph with cost l −1 is n′ = 2(l −1)k +k, so we reach a contradiction because
n > n′.
1 s1 s2 sk−1 sk n
l 2l 2l l
Figure 5.5: Best Nash Equilibrium in path graphs
Proposition 5.1.3. Let Γ = (Pn ,k), for any n ≥ k. There exists a Nash Equilib-
rium strategy s such that C (s)= n−k2 and for every other Nash Equilibrium strat-
egy s′ it holds that C (s′)≤C (s)
Proof. Let s = (n−k2 +1, . . . n−k2 +k) be a strategy profile for Γ.
C (s)= n−k2 . The burning distance b(G , s)=max{d(1, s1),d(sk ,n)}= n−k2 .
s ∈NE. If any player i wants to change his strategy si to s′i he have two options:
• s′i ∈
{
1, . . . n−k2
}
The distance d(sk ,n) does not change, so b(G , (s−i , s′i )) =
b(G , s).
• s′i ∈
{
n−k
2 +k+1, . . . ,n
}
Thedistanced(s1,1) does not change, so b(G , (s−i , s′i ))=
b(G , s).
All other possible moves are already ocuped by another seed, so player i does
not improve his cost changing to there (the cost would be∞). Then any player
has incentive to change his strategy, therefor s ∈NE.
∀s′∈SC (s′)≤C (s). Let us suppose a strategy s′ such that s′ ∈NE andC (s′)>C (s).
Having a cost bigger than smeans that all the seeds in s′ are in {1, . . . , n2 −1} or in
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{n2 +1, . . . ,n} because if there is at least one seed in the center of the graph and
the others are distributed in both sides the maximum cost is C (s). If all seeds
are in one side of the graph then it cannot be a NEbecause any player could
change to the node n2 and improve the cost.
1 s1 sk n
n−k
2 k
n−k
2
Figure 5.6: Worst Nash Equilibrium in path graphs
Corollary 5.1.2. Let Γ= (Pn ,k). Then POA(Γ)=O(k)
Proof. The POA is the ratio between the Social Optimum and the Equilibrium
with worst cost:
POA(Γ)= maxs∈NEC (s),
mins∈SC (s)
POA(Γ)=
n−k
2
n
2k
POA(Γ)=
(
1− k
n
)
k
As a conclusion of the study of the QUICK-BURNING game in path graphs we
can say that the Price of Anarchy is at most n/4. Let us supose a path graph
Pn for a arbitrary big n and the game Γ(Pn ,
n
2 ). With
n
2 we can place all seeds
starting from one endpoint of the graph each two nodes, s = (1,3, . . . ,n− 2,n)
then C (s)= 1. The strategy profile s is a social optimum and a NE. In this case
the worst NE is sw = (n4 , . . . ,n− n4 ), where all seeds are ocuping themiddle of the
graph. The cost of sw isC (sw )= n4 then POA=
n
4
1 = n4 .
The worst case equilibrium possible in Path graphs is when k = n/2, so there
is a seed for every two nodes of the graph. The social optimum in this case is
when all odd (or even) labeled nodes of the graph have a seed on them, then
the Social Cost is clearly 1.
But, if we place all nodes in the middle of the path, the social cost is n/4, then
POA= n/4
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5.2 Nash Equilibria in cycle graphs
In this section we study the quality of the equilibria in cycle graphs. A cycle
graph (from now on denoted by Cn , where n is the number of nodes in the
graph) is a connected graph where each node have degree 2.
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 5.7: Cycle graph C5
2 players game
Lemma 5.2.1. Let Γ= (Cn ,2). If s is a Nash Equilibrium of Γ then C (s)=
⌈n−2
4
⌉
Proof. This proof is divided in two cases, depending on the parity of n.
n even For each node v inCn there exists a node vo , that we will call the oppo-
site of v in Cn , such that the distance from v to vo is
n−2
2 . There are two
paths from v to vo that have this length. The burning time of the strategy
s = (v,vo),∀v ∈ Cn is n−22 /2 = n−24 and it is a Nash Equilibrium because
no player can improve his cost. If s1 = v and s2 6= vo the burning time will
be greater than n−24 because one of the paths from s1 to s2 will be longer
that n−22 , then s2 will always have incentive to change to vo because it will
improve his cost. This case is illustrated in Figure 5.8a
n odd For each node v in Cn there exists two opposite nodes vo1 and vo2 that
are at maximum distance from v , the distance from v to vo1 and vo2 is
n−3
2 . A strategy consisting in s = (v,vo1) or s = (v,vo2), ∀v ∈ Cn have
cost C (s) = n−34 and it is a Nash Equilibrium because none of the play-
ers can improve his cost. Given a strategy profile s = (s1, s2) if s1 = v and
s2 6∈ {vo1,vo2} the burning time will be greater than n−34 , so it holds that
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C (s−2,vo1)<C (s) then s cannot be a Nash Equilibrium.This case is illus-
trated in Figure 5.8b
s0
s1
s′1
(a) (s0, s1) and (s0, s′1) ∈NE
s0
s1
(b) NE with n odd
Figure 5.8: NE in Cn with k = 2
Corollary 5.2.1. Let Γ= (Cn ,k). Then POA(Γ)= 1
Proof. The POA is the relation of the cost of OPT and the worst NE. By Proposi-
tion 4.3.1 every NE is an optimum then in the game with 2 players POA= 1.
k players game
In the k players game with cycle graph, given a strategy s we can define the
burning cost as:
b(G , s)=max
{
d(s1, s2)
2
,
d(s2, s3)
2
, . . . ,
d(sk−1, sk)
2
,
d(sk , s1)
2
}
supposing that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k there is not any seed in the path between si
and si+1 (sk+1 = s1, s1−1 = sk).
Lemma 5.2.2. Let Γ= (Cn ,k), for any k ≤ n. Then OPT(Γ)=
⌈
n−k
2k
⌉
Proof. Let l be a integer such that (l −1)k+k < n ≤ lk+k. Let
s∗ = ((l +1)i )∀i∈{0,...,k−1}
be a strategy for Γ. In s∗ it holds that ∃i∈{1,...,k} such that d(si , si+1)= l and that
∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} then d(si , si+1) ≤ l . An example of this strategy is show in Figure
5.9.
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C (s∗) = l . The maximum distance between two consecutive seeds is l , then
b(G , s∗)= l2 .
s∗ ∈ OPT(Γ). Let us suppose the strategy s′ such that C (s′)<C (s∗)= l . In s′ the
maximum distance between two consecutive seeds it at most l − 1, if l is odd
and l −2 is l is even. Then, the number of nodes would be n′ ≤ k(l −1)+k, so
we reach a contradiction because n′ < n.
s0
s1
s2
s3
Figure 5.9: OPT in C12 with k = 4
Lemma 5.2.3. Let Γ = (Cn ,k), for any n ≥ k. There exists a Nash Equilibrium
strategy s such that C (s)=
⌈
n−k−1
4
⌉
and for every other Nash Equilibrium strat-
egy s′ it holds that C (s′)≤C (s)
Proof. Let r = n−k2 . Let s = (i )∀i∈{0,...,(k−1)/2}, (k + r +1)∀i∈{1,...,/k−1)/2} . There is an
example of s in Figure 5.10a with n = 12 and k = 6.
C (s) = r /2. In s the seeds are grouped in two opposite sides of the cycle. The
maximum distance between two consecutive seeds is the maximum between
d(s1, sk) and d(s k
2
, s k
2+1) that is r /2.
s ∈ NE. Any player cannot change his action and improve his cost. Suppose a
player i want to change from si to s′i . Since both sides of the cycle are full of
seeds s′i can only be in the seeds between s1 and sk or between s k2 and s k2+1.
• In the seeds between s1 and sk there wont be any new seed between s k
2
and s k
2+1, so b(G , (s−i , s
′)= b(G , s).
• In the seeds between s k
2
and s k
2+1 there wont be any new seed between s k2
and s k
2+1, so b(G , (s−i , s
′)= b(G , s).
Therefore any player cant improve his cost changing his strategy.
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There can be other strategies that are in NE and have cost r /2 such the one in
Figure 5.10a.
s0
s1
s2
s4
s5
s6
(a)
s0
s1
s2s4
s5
s6
(b)
Figure 5.10: Worst NE in C12 with k = 6
Corollary 5.2.2. Let Γ= (Cn ,k). The POA(Γ)=O(k).
Proof.
POA(Γ)= maxs∈NEC (s),
mins∈SC (s)
POA(Γ)=
n−k−1
4
n−k
2k
= 2k(n−k−1)
4(n−k)
POA(Γ)= k
2
(
1− 1
n−k
)
As we can see the POA is sightly smaller in cycles than it is in paths but it is also
dependent on the number of players.
5.3 Other topologies: An experimental study
The experiments with different types of graphs gave us intuition to obtain the
theoretical results of the previous section. We implemented a experimental
setupwherewe could simulate the QUICK-BURNING GAMEwith different graphs
and number of players.
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5.3.1 Algorithms
We implementedfirst a Pythonmodule for representing and constructing graphs.
We can construct graph with a list of vertices and edges, from a concrete topol-
ogy, such as a path graph, cycle graph, different types of trees or a random
graph with concrete features, such as a connected graph with a given num-
ber of nodes and edges, a random tree of a given number of nodes or a bipar-
tite graph. The implementation details can be found at Appendix A.1. Given a
graph we can compute thematrix distance between its nodes and compute the
burning time of a graph and a subset of its nodes.
For each graph topologywe generate a dataset of graphswith different sizes and
features and, for every graph, we compute the cost of the best and the worst NE
with different number of players.
5.3.2 Topologies
Path-Star Graphs
APath-StarGraph is a tree such that only onenode, called root, have unbounded
degree and the remaining nodes have degree at most 2. The paths between the
root and the leaves are called legs. In Figure 5.11a we can see a star graph with
3 legs of length 4. Note that legs don’t necessarily have the same length, such as
the one in Figure 5.11b.
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(a) Star Graph with 3 legs of length 4
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11
1
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(b) Star Graphwith 4 legs of different length
We generate star-path graph with 3, 4 and 5 legs, all with same length, from 5
to 10. The implementation of the star-path graph is described in Appendix A.1.
For each graph, we compute all the NE with from 3 to 6 players.
The relevant results on star-path graph are summarized in table 5.12. The pa-
rameters of the experiment are the following:
• # legs: Degree of the root of the graph
• length: Distance from the root to the leaves
• k: Number of players
• Cmin: Minimum cost of a NE
• Cmax: Maximum cost of a NE
• POA: Price of the Anarchy
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# legs length k Cmin Cmax POA
4 5 2 5 5 1.0
4 5 3 5 5 1.0
4 5 4 3 5 1.6
4 5 5 2 5 2.5
4 5 6 2 5 2.5
4 10 2 10 10 1.0
4 10 3 10 10 1.0
4 10 4 5 10 2.0
4 10 5 3 10 3.33
5 5 2 5 5 1.0
5 5 3 5 5 1.0
5 5 4 5 5 1.0
5 5 5 3 5 1.6
5 5 6 2 5 2.5
Figure 5.12: Quality of Equilibria in star-path graph
If k < #legs, then the POA is 1, because the cost of all equilibrium strategies is
the length of the longest leg. As there are not enough seeds to place one in every
leg then all equilibrium strategies should place one seed in the root. If there is
not a seed in the root, the cost of the strategy is the distance from the closest
seed to the root plus the length of the longest leg without a seed. But, if k ≥
#legs, then the POA increases because there exists equilibrium strategies that
split the seeds among the legs, so the nodes in every leg have a close seed, then
the cost is smaller than the leg length, but there are equilibrium strategies with
worst cost, for example any strategy that places a seed at the root and leaves
two or more legs without any seed.
The worst NE are strategies where all seeds are close to the root and there are at
least two legs without any seed. The best NE are strategies where every leg have
nodes dividing it as much as possible. The POA increases with the number of
players and the length of the legs.
Binary Trees
A complete binary tree is a binary tree inwhich all nodes but the root and leaves
have degree 3. The distance between the root and the leaves is called the depth
of the tree. In Figure 5.13 we can see a complete binary tree of depth 4.
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Figure 5.13: Complete binary tree of depth 4
We generate complete binary trees with depth from 2 to 6. With each graph we
compute all the NE with from 2 to 7 players. The implementation of the binary
tree is described in Appendix A.1.
The relevant results on complete binary trees are summarize in Table 5.14. The
parameters of the experiment are the following:
• depth: Distance from the root to the leaves
• k: Number of players
• Cmin: Minimum cost of a NE
• Cmax: Maximum cost of a NE
• POA: Price of the Anarchy
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depth k Cmin Cmax POA
4 2 2 3 1.5
4 3 2 3 1.5
4 4 2 3 1.5
4 5 1 3 3
4 6 1 3 3
4 7 1 3 3
5 2 3 4 1.33
5 3 3 4 1.33
5 4 2 4 2
5 5 2 4 2
5 6 2 4 2
5 7 2 4 2
6 2 4 5 1.25
6 3 4 5 1.25
6 4 3 5 1.66
6 5 3 5 1.66
6 6 3 5 1.66
Figure 5.14: Results on Binary Tree
We observe from the experiments in binary trees the worst NE are when the
seeds are close to the root, so with only one change at least one of the paths
between the root and the leaves will be uncovered, then the cost is close to the
depth of the tree. The best case NE are when all paths from the leaves to the
root have seeds distributed over them. Than is possible when we have enough
seeds to cover a whole level of the tree, then all paths have nodes in it. The cost
in this case depends on howdeep is the level that we can cover, the cost is better
as the level is more equidistant from the root and the leaves, and on howmany
levels can we cover. The POA increases with the number of players.
n-ary Trees
A n-ary tree is a tree such that every node have at most n children. A n-ary tree
is called complete if all interior nodes (those that are neither the root or a leaf)
have exactly n children and all the leaves are at the same distance from the root.
The distance from a leaf to the root is called the depth of the tree. In Figure 5.15
we can see a 3-ary tree with depth 3.
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Figure 5.15: 3-ary tree of depth 3
We generate n-ary trees with from 3 to 5 branches and depth from 3 to 5. With
each graph we compute all the NE with from 2 to 5 players. The implementa-
tion of the n-ary tree is described in Appendix A.1
The relevant results on complete n-ary trees are summarized in Table 5.16. The
parameters of the experiment are the following:
• # branches: Maximum children that a node can have
• depth: Distance from the root to the leaves
• k: Number of players
• Cmin: Minimum cost of a NE
• Cmax: Maximum cost of a NE
• POA: Price of the Anarchy
# branches depth k Cmin Cmax POA
3 4 2 3 3 1.0
3 4 3 2 3 1.5
3 4 4 2 3 1.5
3 4 5 2 3 1.5
4 4 2 3 3 1.0
4 4 3 3 3 1.0
4 4 4 2 3 1.5
4 4 5 2 3 1.5
Figure 5.16: Results on n-ary trees
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As in the case of binary trees, the worst case NE are strategies where all seeds
are close to the root. The best NE are when some levels as far from the leaves
and to the root are completely covered with seeds. The POA depends on the
number of players.
Series parallel graphs
We define simple series parallel graph as the subclass of series parallel graphs
where each graph consists in two terminal nodes s and t and one or more dis-
joint paths between s and t . In Figure 5.17 is shown a Simple Series Parallel
graph with 4 paths of length 4.
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Figure 5.17: Simple series parallel graph with 4 paths of length 4
We generate simple series parallel graphs with 3 and 4 paths of length between
3 and 8. The implementation of simple series parallel graphs is described in
Appendix A.1. With each graph we compute all the NE with from 2 to 8 play-
ers.
The relevant results on simple series parallel graphs are summarized in Table
5.18. The parameters of the experiment are the following:
• # paths: Number of disjoint paths between terminal nodes
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• length: Length of the paths between terminal nodes
• k: Number of players
• Cmin: Minimum cost of a NE
• Cmax: Maximum cost of a NE
• POA: Price of the Anarchy
# paths length k Cmin Cmax POA
3 8 2 4 5 1.25
3 8 3 4 5 1.25
3 8 4 3 5 1.66
3 8 5 2 5 2.5
3 8 6 2 5 2.5
3 8 7 2 5 2.5
3 8 8 1 5 5
Figure 5.18: Results on simple series parallel graphs
As we have been observing in different types of graphs all the diametral paths
should be covered in order to have good strategies. The worst NE are strategies
where all seeds are close to the terminals s and t , then the cost is closer to the
length of the paths between s and t . The best NE are strategies where seeds are
distributed along all the paths between s and t . If all of the paths between the
terminals cannot be covered with at least one seed because k is too small, then
the POA is small, but when we have enough seeds it rapidly increases when we
increase the number of players.
5.3.3 Real data: DBLP dataset
After studing simple graphswe study how the game behaveswith real data from
an online social network. We tested the game model using a graph extracted
from DBLP dataset. We used a snapshot of the DBLP dataset from February 2,
2016, downloaded from [3]. The DBLP dataset consist un a database of scien-
tific papers, with attributes such as the topic, the publication date, the author
(or authors), etc.
From this data we constructed the graph Gdblp = (V ,E) as follows: Nodes in V
are authors of papers. There exists an edge (u,v ′) in E if the authors u and v
have co-authored at least one paper.
57
Since the whole graph was excessively big we extract subgraphs from it and
evaluate how the equilibrium strategies are. We select different subgraphs by
diameter. We generated graphs with sizes from 20 to 1000, with diameters from
1 to 12. The computation of all the NE of a graph than more than 100 nodes
last for long time, so we only study the equilibria of small subgraphs of DBLP
(the whole graph have about 300000 nodes). Wich each graph we computed all
the NE in games with from 2 to 6 players. In Figures 5.20 and 5.19 we can see
different DBLP subgraphs.
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Figure 5.19: Example subgraph of DBLP colaboration with n = 40 and
diameter= 6
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Figure 5.20: Example subgraph of DBLP colaboration with n = 30 and
diameter= 5
Some of the results with graphs exatracted from DBLP dataset are summarized
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in Table 5.21. The parameters of the experiment are the following:
• n: Number of nodes of the graph
• Diameter: Length of the longest shortest path between any two nodes in
the graph
• k: Number of players
• Cmin: Minimum cost of a NE
• Cmax: Maximum cost of a NE
• POA: Price of the Anarchy
n Diameter k Min C Max C PoA
25 5 2 2 3 1.5
25 5 3 2 3 1.5
25 5 4 2 3 1.5
25 5 5 1 3 3.0
25 5 6 1 3 3.0
30 5 2 2 3 1.5
30 5 3 2 3 1.5
30 5 4 2 3 1.5
30 5 5 2 3 1.5
40 6 2 3 3 1.0
40 6 3 2 3 1.5
40 6 4 2 3 1.5
40 6 5 2 3 1.5
40 6 6 1 3 3.0
Figure 5.21: Results on DBLP
In the subgraphs of DBLP we observe that, as well in other studied topologies,
as the number of players increase the POA increases too. Graphs with higher
diamter have higher POA too, because the cost of the worst case equilibria is
bounded by the diameter of the graph.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The initial goals of the project were to develop a game theoretical model for the
optimization problem of the K-CENTER, where players would selfishly choose
the subset of seeds. We wanted to study the existence of NE in the game and
the computational complexity of different problems associated with it, like de-
ciding if an strategy is a NE, computing the best response for a player or com-
puting an optimum strategy. Our aim was to study the quality of the NE of the
game. We wanted to compare the quality of the NE of the gamewith the results
of known approximation algorithms for the K-CENTER PROBLEM.
We have defined the QUICK-BURNING GAME, a game theoretical model of the
K-CENTER problem. In our model each player chooses where to place a seed in
a graph expecting that all the nodes of the graph become active as fast as pos-
sible. We model the diffusion process similarly to the Linear Threshold Model
described in [13], where all nodes have threshold θv = 1 and where for every
two nodes u,v that are connected in the graph the weight is bu,v = 1, so it its
only needed one activate neighbour to activate any node. The cost of a player
in our model is the same for all players and it is defined as what we called the
Burning Time of a graph G = (V ,E) and a set of nodes S ⊆ V , the number of
time-steps all nodes are infected. This is equivalent to the maximum distance
from any node to its closest node in S. The Social Cost of the game is the same
that he cost for any player.
Ourmain results for general graphs are the following: All instances of the QUICK-
BURNING GAME have a NE because the OPT is always a NE. As the OPT is always
a NE then the Price of Stability is 1. In a QUICK-BURNING GAME there may exist
NE with a social cost that are not optimal strategies.
We studied different computational problems associated with the game. The
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computation of the best response for a player can be computed in polynomial
time. Deciding if a given strategy is a NE can be done in polynomial time .
Unless P = NP computing a OPT strategy cannot be done in polynomial time,
because it is NP-hard.
We experimented with a Best Response dynamics process where, starting from
a random strategy, players are given the opportunity in rounds to change his
action. It seems that such process always converge in an equilibrium strategy
in a reasonable amount of rounds. It would be interesting to study the quality
of the resulting equilibrium strategies.
We focus the study of the behaviour of our gamemodel in different graph topolo-
gies. For each different topology we were interested in see how are the best and
the worst equilibrium strategies and how is the cost of those strategies. In the
case of paths graphs we show that:
• The OPT strategies are the ones that distribute the seeds along the path,
where the maximum distance between two consecutive seeds is similar
the double of the distance of the first seed and the start of the path and
the last seed and the end of the graph.
• All OPT strategies are also NE, so the POS is path graphs is 1.
• The worst case NE are strategies where all seeds are accumulated in the
middle of the graph, no permitting that any unilateral change of the ac-
tion of a player improves the cost, because there are two paths that are
not coveredwith any seed and a unilateral changemay only improve one.
The POA in path graphs is POA=O(k), where k is the number of players.
In the case of cycle graph we show that:
• In gameswith 2 players we show that all NE strategies are OPTs, then both
the POA and the POS are 1.
• In games with more than 2 players the OPT strategies are the ones where
seeds are distributing along the cycle, with distances between consecu-
tive seeds as close as possible. In this case the cost is n−k2k . The POS in
games with more than 2 players is 1.
• Theworst case NE are strategies where seeds are grouped in two opposite
sites of the graph, so the nodes between the two groups of seeds are far
from their closest seeds. In those strategies there are to paths between the
groups of seeds so any unilateral change would not be able to cover both
paths, then there is no way that a single player improves that strategies.
The cost of this strategies is n−k−14 . The POA in games with cycle graphs
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andmore than 2 players is POA=O(k).
With other topologies we do not have proved theoretical results, but we carried
out experiments that give us some ideas.
With star-path graphs we observed that the equilibrium strategies have a very
similar cost when there are no seeds enough to place at least one in each of the
legs that the worst and best cost are the same, but if there are enough seeds
to place at least one in each leg then there are equilibrium strategies with a
variety of costs, some of them far from the optimum. A worst case equilibria
is a strategy where all seeds are close to the root and there are at least two or
more legs without seeds distributed along them (there may be any seed or all
of them can be very close to the root, so the cost is close to the length of the
legs). The best NE strategies in this case are strategies where each leg have
seeds distributed in it, asmuch divided as possible. The POA increases with the
number of players and the length of the legs.
With n-ary (including binary) complete trees we observed that, similarly as
happens in star-path graph, if we do not have enough seeds to fill the inter-
mediate levels of the tree then the worst and best cost are the same, but if we
can fill whole levels then the cost of the equilibrium strategies varies. Best NE
in trees places are strategies that fill as much as possible levels in the tree such
that the seeds are dividing the paths between the root and the leaves, as much
equidistant from both as possible. The worst NE are strategies where seeds are
in the top levels of the tree, close to the root, making not able to cover all paths
to the leafs in one move. In complete n-ary trees the POA increase with the
number of players and the depth of the tree.
In simple series parallel graphs the best NE are strategies that distribute the
seeds along all the paths between terminal nodes. The worst NE are strategies
where the seeds are close to terminal nodes, so the cost is close to the half of
the distance between terminal nodes. As in star-path graphs and in n-ary trees
at least one seed should be placed in each of the diametral paths of the graph
in order to have a equilibrium strategy with good cost.
Experimenting with real world data from the DBLP co-authoring database we
observed that, as seen in the studied topologies, that the POA increaseswith the
number of players. Subgraphs of DBLP with larger diameter had also a higher
POA.
The theoretical and empirical results suggest that the POA of a game is in rela-
tionwith the number of players andwith the diameter of the graph. Graphwith
large diameter must have seeds placed wisely, spread on the diametral paths of
the graph in order to achieve a good cost. But if all the seeds are placed close to
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the nodes with maximum eccentricity the cost will be close to the diameter of
the graph, which may be times worse than the optimum.
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Chapter 7
Future work
There remain some open problems related to the proposed strategic game and
its variations.
We though about a different cost function that penalizes players for placing
seeds not only in the same node as another player, but in a node that is close
to another seed. That cost function would lead the player to spread the seeds
along the graph, avoiding some of the worst case equilibria described in this
project, that occurred when seeds where very close between them.
Another interesting modification of our game would be to assign a ‘budget’ of
seeds to each player, so the actions for every player are a set of nodes of the
graph, not only one.
Itmay be interesting to study the cost of the NE computed by Best Response dy-
namics process compared with the approximation algorithm in [12] and study
how are the subsets of nodes computed by this and other known approxima-
tions, if they can bemapped to an equilibrium strategy and how good is it qual-
ity. We expect them to have good costs, because the approximation ratio of
those algorithm is a constant factor of 2, usually smaller than the number of
players.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Code
A.1 Graphmodule
The graph is implemented as a dictionary of nodes, where the key is the label
of a node (a string) and the value is a list of the labels of its neighbours.
c lass Graph :
def __ ini t__ ( se l f , V= [ ] , E= [ ] ) :
s e l f . graph = dict ( )
s e l f .mat=None
se l f . act ives = set ( )
for v in V:
s e l f . add_node( v )
for e in E :
fr , to = e
s e l f . add_edge ( fr , to )
def get_nodes ( s e l f ) :
return l i s t ( s e l f . graph . keys ( ) )
def add_node( se l f , node_name ) :
i f node_name not in s e l f . graph :
n = Node(node_name)
s e l f . graph [node_name] = n
def add_edge ( se l f , node_from , node_to ) :
i f is instance (node_from , int ) :
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node_from = s t r (node_from)
i f is instance (node_to , int ) :
node_to = s t r (node_to )
i f node_from in se l f . graph and \
node_to in s e l f . graph and \
node_from != node_to :
s e l f . graph [node_from ] . add_neighbor (node_to )
s e l f . graph [node_to ] . add_neighbor (node_from)
We implemented some predefined graph, such as paths, cycles or trees. The
labels of the generated graphs are ′1′, . . . ,′n′ where n is the number of nodes in
the graph.
def line_graph (n ) :
V = [ s t r ( x ) for x in range (n ) ]
g = Graph(V)
for x in range (n−1):
g . add_edge ( s t r ( x ) , s t r ( x+1))
return g
def cycle_graph (n ) :
g = line_graph (n)
g . add_edge ( ’0 ’ , s t r (n−1))
return g
def binary_tree (depth ) :
V = [ s t r ( x ) for x in range (2 ** depth − 1) ]
E = [ ]
g = Graph(V,E)
i f depth>1:
g . add_edge ( ’0 ’ , ’1 ’ )
g . add_edge ( ’0 ’ , ’2 ’ )
for l eve l in range (1 , depth ) :
f irst_node = 2 ** level−1
last_node = 2 ** ( l eve l +1) −2
n = first_node
while n <= last_node :
g . add_edge ( s t r (n) , s t r (2*n + 1) )
g . add_edge ( s t r (n) , s t r (2*n + 2) )
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n += 1
return g
def n_ary_tree (n , depth ) :
V = [ ’ 0 ’ ]
E = [ ]
l a s t _ l v l = [ ’ 0 ’ ]
last_node = 0
for l v l in range (1 , depth ) :
new_lvl = [ ]
for act in l a s t _ l v l :
for chld in range (n ) :
last_node += 1
new_lvl . append( s t r ( last_node ) )
E . append ( ( s t r ( act ) , s t r ( last_node ) ) )
V . append( s t r ( last_node ) )
l a s t _ l v l = new_lvl
return Graph(V,E)
def star_path_graph ( n_legs , leg_length ) :
n_nodes = 0
V = [ ’ 0 ’ ]
E = [ ]
i f is instance ( leg_length , int ) :
leg_length = [ leg_length for _ in range ( n_legs ) ]
for leg in leg_length :
V . append( s t r (n_nodes+1))
E . append( ( ’ 0 ’ , s t r (n_nodes+1) ) )
for v in range (n_nodes+2 , n_nodes+1+leg ) :
V . append( s t r ( v ) )
E . append ( ( s t r ( v−1) , s t r ( v ) ) )
n_nodes += leg
g = Graph(V, [ ] )
for e in E :
g . add_edge ( * e )
return g
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A.2 QuickBurningGamemodule
We implemented some computational problemsof the QUICK-BURNING GAME.
Cost Functions
The cost of the player is described in Section 4.2 as
ci (s)=
{
∞ ∃ j : si = s j
b(G ,S) otherwise
def cost_player ( graph , strategy , i ) :
s t rategy = l i s t ( s trategy )
s i = strategy .pop( i )
for s j in strategy :
i f graph . distance ( si , s j ) < 1 :
return f loa t ( ’ inf ’ )
s trategy . inser t ( i , s i )
graph . clear_actived ( )
for s in strategy :
graph . activate_node ( s )
cost = graph . burn_graph ( )
return cost
The Social Cost of a game is described in Section 4.2 asC (s)= b(G ,S)
def socia l_cost ( graph , seeds ) :
i f len ( set ( seeds ) ) < len ( seeds ) :
cost = f l oa t ( ’ inf ’ )
e lse :
graph . activate_nodes ( seeds )
cost = graph . burn_graph ( )
graph . clear_actived ( )
return cost
Nash Equilibria
Checks if a strategy is a Nash Equilibrium. The parameters are a graph and the
strategy. The number of players is the length of the strategy vector. For each
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player it test all the alternative actions and returns False if by changing to any
of them the cost improve, otherwise return True .
def is_nash (graph , s t ra tegy_prof i l e ) :
i n i t i a l _ co s t = socia l_cost ( graph , s t ra tegy_prof i l e )
for i in range ( len ( s t ra tegy_prof i l e ) ) :
new_strategy = l i s t ( s t ra tegy_prof i l e )
current_move = new_strategy .pop( i )
alternative_moves = set ( graph . get_nodes ( ) ) − \
set ( new_strategy )
for a_ i i in alternative_moves :
aux_strategy = l i s t ( new_strategy )
aux_strategy . inser t ( i , a _ i i )
new_cost = socia l_cost ( graph , aux_strategy )
i f new_cost < in i t i a l _ co s t :
return False
return True
The function below computes all NE in a game and returns a tuple containing
the cost of the worst NE, a NE that have the cost of the worst NE, the cost of
the best NE and a NE that have the cost of the best NE.
def analize_equilibrium (g , k ) :
worst_strategy = best_strategy = None
worst_cost = −1
best_cost = f l oa t ( ’ inf ’ )
for strategy in combinations (g . get_nodes ( ) , k ) :
i f is_nash (g , s trategy ) :
cost = socia l_cost (g , s trategy )
i f cost > worst_cost :
worst_cost = cost
worst_strategy = strategy
i f cost < best_cost :
best_cost = cost
best_strategy = strategy
return worst_cost , worst_strategy , best_cost , best_strategy
Best Response
The best response for a player given a strategy are those actions that give less
cost for that player if he changes his action to one of them. The function below
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computes an action that is in the best response for that player given a strat-
egy.
def BR(g , s , i ) :
i = int ( i )
act_cost = cost_player (g , s , i )
act_a = s [ i ]
s_act = l i s t ( s )
for n in g . get_nodes ( ) :
s_act [ i ] = n
new_cost = cost_player (g , s_act , i )
i f new_cost < act_cost :
act_cost = new_cost
act_a = n
return act_a
Best Response Dynamics function
We implemented the Best Response dynamics process described in Section 4.5.
The implementation can be found below. Given graph and a number of players,
it generated a random strategy and, in a round-robin style each player is given
the opportunity to change his action to one in his best response. The process
end when in a full round any player changes his action.
72
def dynamics (g , k ) :
s = random_strategy (g , k )
i n i t i a l _ co s t = socia l_cost (g , s )
act_player = 0
changes = 0
changes_r= 0
rounds = 0
s0 = l i s t ( s )
while 1 :
a_i = BR(g , s , act_player )
sp = l i s t ( s )
sp [ act_player ] = a_i
i f cost_player (g , sp , act_player )< cost_player (g , s , act_player ) :
s = l i s t ( sp )
changes_r += 1
changes += 1
act_player += 1
i f act_player >= k :
rounds += 1
act_player = 0
i f changes_r == 0:
break
changes_r = 0
f ina l_cos t = socia l_cost (g , s )
return (
f inal_cost ,
in i t i a l _cos t ,
changes ,
rounds ,
s
)
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